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Abstract   
 By the mid 1960s, many African leaders had concluded that what Africa needed badly 
was rapid economic growth to catch up with the Western advanced global economy. In all too 
soon, changes in government began to occur via military putsch. Military coup more or less 
became institutionalized. Consequently, African states began to experience military, 
militarism and authoritarianism coupled with persistent economic policy failures. Africa’s 
quest for rapid economic growth and development therefore became taunted and hence 
underdevelopment. As a result, two decades or less, African states focused on economic 
development strategies, nonetheless, both economic development strategies and regional 
integration idea failed to yield development dividend.  Therefore, at the turn of the 21st 
century consensus emerged that the root cause of Africa’s underdevelopment is ‘bad 
governance.’  Accordingly, many African countries including Ghana embraced liberal 
democracy and have since 1990s been democratizing state institutions.  Few African countries 
including Ghana has more or less ‘perfected’ electoral democracy though, democratizing state 
institutions and deepening democratic culture remain problematic. What accounts for the 
difficulty in customizing and deepening democratic culture and values? Using in-depth 
interview with selected political scientists and few experts in democracy affairs, this paper 
explored the historical trajectories and validity of neopatrimonialism, as a partial explanation 
for Ghana’s 1992 re- democratization nuances.    Findings show that neopatrimonial rule is 
so pervasive in post-colonial Ghana in particular and Africa in general. This paper concluded 
that beneath what appears to be a successful case of democratic stability in Ghana lies sturdy 
neopatrimonial dysfunctionalty that serve as counterweights to democratic culture.  This 
paper is, thus, intended to augment the understanding of the theoretical versatility of 
neopatrimonial thesis as a clarification of the on-going discourse on democratic stability in 
Africa including Ghana.   
Keywords: Economic development, Bad governance, Democratic stability, 
Neopatrimonialism 
 
Introduction 
 At the turn of the 21st century, Africa was the only continent that did not register any 
significant development (Ake, 2000; Mkandawire, 1998; Thompson 2004). According to the 
World Bank’s Reports (2009), per capita income on the continent is the lowest (an average of 
$300), about 65% or more of the population is said to live on less than a Dollar a day, 
Africa’s external debt is over $600 Billion, and in recent times Africa has been the scene of 
ethnic and communal conflicts some of which are very destructive. Worse still, Africa is said 
to be emerging as the epicenter of HIV AIDS. So the question that is often asked is “why is 
Africa not developing?”  Many reasons account for this underdevelopment problem.  
 According to Sawyer (1990) one of the problems is the nature of the African 
dependent state itself.  He argues that the picture presented by independent Africa is one of an 
unintegrated collection of non-industrialized, undemocratic, non-self-sustained states. But, in 
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the mid 1980s the problem was seen as economic and this was captured by Claude Ake in his 
article, “Why is Africa not developing” where he argues that “nearly everywhere in post-
colonial Africa, the tragic consequences of the underdevelopment has come home to us.” 
“Serious as it is however, the problem of post-colonial Africa underdevelopment is believed 
to be only a symptom, effect of deeper maladies, i.e. detrimental economic effect of 
colonization.” 
 In response to Africa’s ‘detrimental economic maladies,’ in the 1980s the World Bank 
and IMF prescribed multiple economic reforms measures to Africa (see for instance; 
Structural Adjustment program (S.A.P.), Economic Recovery Program (E.R.P.) and 
PAMSCAD).  These economic reforms were intended to move Africa away from dependency 
and underdevelopment.  In spite of the rapidity with which Africa pursued these reforms 
however, the development record of Africa indicates that the problem of underdevelopment 
and dependency still persists.  Ake’s (2000) explanation of Africa’s persistent 
underdevelopment is that those economic reforms had not only been pursued with confusion 
of purposes and interest but also the policies and programmes themselves have been full of 
ambiguities and contradictions.  
 As a response to the multiple economic policy failures a new thinking emerged within 
the development community that Africa’s  solution (last resort)  for her development 
predicaments was  developmental regionalism (Mkandawire, 1998).  So, developmental 
regionalism was perceived to provide solutions to many development problems for the south.  
Nonetheless, in sub-Saharan Africa (S.S.A.) there has been little integration simply because 
there is little to integrate (Mkandawire, 1998).  The argument was advanced towards 
establishment of corporate Africa for cooperation within African states hence the Omega 
Plan, the South-South Cooperation and the North- South among other development goals all 
of which has been characterized by various degrees of socio-economic and political 
challenges.  In spite of all the attempts made by Africa in search of permanent solution to the 
development dilemma however, now, the picture which is presented by post-colonial Africa is 
one that is not only marred, but also wallowing in chronic food crisis, debt cancer, poverty 
and squalor. The failure of these economic reforms with their attendant predicaments has led 
many Africanist scholars to re-think Africa’s development agenda. 
 And today, the thinking within the development community is that, it is politics more 
than anything else that is underdeveloping Africa (World Bank and IMF Reports, 2008:2009; 
Ake, 2000; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997).  And hence political reforms have become 
critical on the agenda in most African countries including Ghana. Indeed, political reforms 
have not only replaced economic reforms but also become the new conditionalities for 
financial assistance from the Breton Woods Institutions and governments of the global north 
(World Bank and IMF Reports, 2008:2009; Gyimah-Boadi 2001; And hence Ghana in 
particular has since the early 1990’s been democratizing (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001, Ninsin and 
Drah, 1993).  
 In what follows, this paper analyzes the 1992 re-democratization wave by exploring 
the feasibility of democratic stability in Africa using the circumstances of Ghana.  
 
The 1992 Re-democratization Tide 
 Before proceeding to analyze Ghana’s 1992 re-democratization tide, it is a point 
noteworthy that Huntington’s(1991;1996) first two waves of democratization which occurred 
around 1828-1926 and 1943-1962 respectively were each followed by reversal waves and 
hence Huntington’s democratization wave thesis has come under strong criticism by scholars 
including; Diamond (1996), Linz and Stephan (1996) and, Haynes (2003).  Indeed, in this 
paper, we take issue with all of these authors’ (including Huntington’s use of a blunt 
dichotomous measure of democracy) which we believe creates the potential for analysis of 
democracy and seemingly democratic- autocratic transitions.   
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 Here, it is significant to note that the issue of democratization is without the least 
challenges. As noted by Huntington (1991; 1996), the historical trajectories of 
democratization are not only a precursory but also, the present circumstance involving diverse 
set of structural factors are likely to affect its stability. Although, reasonably valid quantitative 
measures exist for each of these factors and are available for many countries and clearly, 
many studies have confirmed that the problem of instability is critical; however, this paper 
has not identified throughout the literature how neopatrimonial thesis  (the tendencies of 
patronage politics or patron-clientelism), holding other factors constant, constitutes a doomed 
to democratic instability. Indeed, this is what my paper intends to address.   
 In the mean time, using a content analysis as a standard measure of democracy, this 
paper finds substantial support for Huntington’s wave thesis; and little support for the position 
of his critics who argue that there are no democratic waves (Diamond, 1996; Bratton and van 
de Walle 1997). This paper finds clear identifiable trends in the evolution of democratic 
governance throughout the world during the past century that correspond roughly to the 
waves and reverse-waves identified by Huntington, but  it fails to find any support for the 
explanation hypothesized by Huntington(1991: 1996).  Again, using multinomial logic 
analysis of political transitions, this paper finds this waves-like pattern of global 
democratization as associated with shocks to the international system such as; world wars, 
domestic economic growth rates, political neighborhood effects, unequal exchange, 
environmental collapse, and Africa’s global proportion of democracies (Diamond, 1996; Linz 
and Stephan,1996).  Therefore, this paper maintains that democratic waves are not due to 
inherent aspect of democratization as theorized by Huntington. 
 Further findings show that in spite of the obvious challenges of democratization 
however, today, many agree that some democratizing states of Africa have reached the point 
of democratic stability (Abdulai and Crawford, 2008; Daddieh, 2011) and hence democratic 
stability has become the hottest issue in African politics of which Ghana is no exception. 
 This paper establishes that  Ghana overwhelmingly embraced and joined Huntington’s 
(1991;1996) 'Third Wave' of democratization with great enthusiasm and optimism (Joseph, 
1992, Gyimah-Boadi, 2001) and that this same democratic optimism led many African states 
including Ghana to make concerted efforts to democratize state institutions and politics.  Two 
decades or less of democratization of state institutions and its politics yielded significant 
democratic gains in Ghana among other African countries hence some scholars argue that 
Ghana has ‘perfected’ democratic rule at least, at the level of periodic elections and had even 
reached the threshold of sustaining electoral democracy(Abdulai and Crawford, 2008, 
Daddieh, 2011; Gyimah-Boadi, 2001).   
 Notwithstanding the unprecedented record of relatively successful electoral 
democratic gains in Ghana among other African states (Abdulai and Crawford, 2008; 
Daddieh, 2011); however, two decades or more of Ghana’s democratic experience show 
rather, mainly cosmetic democratic gains.  There has been an emergence of strong pessimism 
among Africanist scholars towards democratic sustainability in Ghana in particular. largely 
because of structural problems such as; weak institutions- lack of judicial independence and 
ineffectual legislature as well as pervasive electoral manipulations coalesced with widespread 
patronage politics, political corruption, violence and polarization of the state (van de Walle, 
2002; Booth and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005).  
 Furthermore, the erratic and ambiguous nature of democratic practice in Ghana in 
particular has stimulated heated debates. This paper analyzes “The Controversial and 
Contradictory Debate,” drawing lessons from the optimist and pessimist scholars’ debate on 
the state of democracy in Ghana.  
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The State of Democracy in Ghana:  The Controversial and Contradictory Debate   
 There are two main positions as far as democracy and its stability in Africa including 
Ghana is concerned. The optimist scholars (philosophers who support the success story of 
democracy in Ghana), including; Lindberg and Morison (2007) and, Daddieh (2011) hold the 
view that Ghana’s relatively five (5) successful presidential, parliamentary and district 
Assembly elections held in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008 are indicators of democracy 
progression and by the Ghanaian standard democracy is “matured” in Africa. The optimist 
scholars conclude that each of these elections show significant improvement in terms of “free 
and fairness” as well as successful transfer of powers signifying the passing of Huntington’s’ 
two turnover test.  On the contrary however, the pessimist scholars (philosophers who oppose 
the success story of Ghana’s democracy), including; Bratton and van de Walle (1997); 
Haynes (2003); van de Walle (2002) and Okechuku (2008) hold the view that ‘more elections 
do not mean more democracy,’ in other words, frequent elections do not necessarily produce 
democratic outcomes and that it only risks the fallacy of electoralism, that is, privileging 
elections over all other imperative tenets of democracy.  
 The pessimist scholars argue that by trying to showcase Ghana’s seemingly electoral 
democratic gains for the entire African continent is a serious flaw. The pessimist scholars 
therefore maintain that Ghana’s democracy is “merely surviving and may reverse to a form of 
democratic authoritarianism. They however, conclude that Ghana’s democracy is suffering 
from critical institutional deficiencies hence sustaining Ghana’s democracy becomes so 
problematic. Similarly, Jockers, Kohnert and Nugent (2007) advance the pessimist argument 
by contending that the periodic electoral democratic success in Ghana is a “convenient myth.” 
Indeed, Jockers, Kohnert and Nugent’ position does not only seem to be a repetition of 
Bratton and van de Walle’s (1997) position which maintains that democracy in Ghana is just 
surviving and may reverse or at best remain stagnant but also, both positions really contradict 
Lindberg and Morrison’s (2008) position that there are significant democratic gains.  In fact, 
Lindberg and Morrison’s position reinforces or emphasizes the fact that democracy is 
“matured” in Ghana.    Interestingly, there is an emerging consensus that fit into the 
midstream position and which seems to depart from both the optimists and pessimists’ 
positions.  Indeed, midstream scholars’ position constitutes a missing gap within the literature 
which this paper intends to fill.  The position of this paper is that authors including; Diamond 
, Joseph and Gyimah-Boadi seem to remain uncertain or, for want of a better phrase, ‘they are 
ambivalent’ about the entire game of democracy in Ghana.  This paper supports Diamond 
(1996) and others’ positions and adds that democracy in Ghana gives impressive façade and 
hence it is a mere fantasy. Furthermore, this paper maintains that the erratic and complex 
nature of  Ghana’s democracy requires further interrogation to find empirical answers to 
whether or not democracy is really at work in Ghana and/or  whether or not Ghana is in the 
era of “trial of democracy” or “triumph of democracy.”    
 Indeed, these issues and few others have galvanized the attention of Africanist 
scholars and the institutions of democracy affairs forcefully on the   erratic nature of 
democracy in Ghana. The seemingly erratic democratic outcomes coalesced with the 
diminishing returns in democracy in Ghana have more or less overturned the initial optimism 
of Ghanaians in particular and Africans in general towards liberal democracy (Haynes, 2003; 
Okechuku, 2008). In general, the record of Africa’s more or less poor democratic 
performance according to critics, has been worsened for instance, by the military overthrow of 
constitutionally elected president Ndudaye of Burundi in 1993 (within three months), 
president, Jawara of Gambia in 1994, the military coup in Madagascar and the Republic of 
Guinea, and recently, Mali’s political unrest coupled with democratic succession after the 
demise of Eyadema in Togo among other counter-democratic events in other parts of Africa 
(Daddieh, 2011; Gyimah-Boadi 2008). Indeed, this democratic dilemma in Africa prompted 
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Diamond to ask “Is the Third Wave over?” And perhaps also, motivated Joseph (1998) to 
conclude “democracy in Africa, from Abertura to closure....”    
 The critical questions then,  are: ‘In reality, what is the reflection of democracy in 
Ghana in particular and Africa in general?  Is it “Shock democracy,”  “pseudo-democracy” or, 
“virtual democracy?”   Do African states including Ghana have what it takes to democratize?  
This paper therefore teases out empirical responses for these questions.   
 Meanwhile, as part of the explanation of the erratic nature of democracy in Ghana, 
responses from interviews conducted with some selected staff of Center for Democratic 
Development (CDD), Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG), political scientists from 
the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon and other experts of 
democracy affairs based in Ghana in November 2012 prior to the 2012 elections admitted that 
there is not even a single election conducted in Ghana in particular that has been free from 
allegations of electoral manipulations such as rigging, stolen of ballot boxes or electoral 
violence involving, intimidation of voters. And, hence the informants interviewed concluded 
that generally, electoral democracy in Ghana in particular and Africa in general lacks 
credibility.  Evidence shows also that, unfortunately, in many cases, the Coalition of 
Domestic Elections Observers (CODEO) and  the International Observers (IO) have  been 
alleged to have falsely endorsed outcomes of elections in Ghana as “free and fair” (Daily 
Graphic December 28, 2012; Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012). Another empirical evidence 
is a case in contention in which Ghana’s 2012 election results is being contested by the New 
Patriotic Party (NPP)  at the supreme court on the account of electoral manipulation  by the 
Electoral Commission (EC) and the Incumbent (see Daily Guide, Monday, December 31, 
2012). Also, evidential is several cases of election disputes including; Ghana’s: 1996, 2004 
and 2008 and the case of Kenya’s in 2013, emphasizing rather, the “trial of democracy” (and 
also, introducing a new democratic concept  such as “Judicial Democracy Test”),   other than 
the “triumph of democracy.”  In addition, there have also been several election boycotts i.e. 
Ghana, in 1992 and 2008 and, Togo, in 1993 by the seemingly non-favoured party. Indeed, 
the 2010 Ivorian crisis in Cote D’Ivoire involving the then president, Laurent Gbagbo and 
Alassane Ouatarra also reinforces that all is not well with democracy in Africa. Findings of 
this paper confirm that there have been massive democratic erosions resulting from periodic 
election manipulations and engineered by neopatrimonialism.  Thus, the emerging worry is 
that the current liberal agenda in most Africa including Ghana is facing a potential threat and 
if care is not taken, it may pin down the democratic credential achieved or recorded over the 
years.    
 Seeing the complex nature of Ghana’s ‘democratic dilemma,’ several attempts made 
so far by many Africanist scholars to address Ghana’s democratic refraction remain basically 
theoretical solutions or explanations.  In other words, attempts to comprehend the 
impediments of democratic stability in Africa including Ghana proceeded via political 
participation and political culture analysis, political economy theory explanation, institutional 
approach as well as transitional analysis (see Ake, 2000, Huntington, 1991:1996; Bratton and 
van de Walle, 1997; Sandbrook and Oelbaum, 1999; Diamond, 1996; Joseph 1992; Aidoo, 
2008).  The point of departure of this paper is that neopatrimonial rule is not only so 
widespread in post-independent Ghana but also manifests itself in multiple dimensions. Hence 
this paper speculates that neopatrimonialism exclusively contributes significantly to 
democracy nuances in Ghana.   This paper attempts at explaining not only why “Ghana’s 
democracy does not work”, but also why “disorders have become political instrument in 
securing political legitimacy,” using neopatrimonial thesis.  This paper therefore interrogates 
first, the extent to which neopatrimonialism (patron –client network) is pervasive, second, the 
multiple forms of neopatrimonialism and its utility, third, the nexus between 
neopatrimonialism and democratic stability.  
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 In what follows, the paper conceptualizes neopatrimonialism and explores its 
pervasiveness, its multi-dimensional framework, its utility and manifestations and finally 
shows how its co-existence with legal-rational democracy may turn to undermine democratic 
stability.   
 
The Multiple Frameworks of Neopatrimonialism 
 This paper contends that the study of neopatrimonialism has a long tradition in area 
studies and comparative research as well (Mkandawire, 1998; deGrassi, 2008; Theobad, 1982; 
Aidoo and DeMarco, 2009). The conventional thinking is that African states are the most 
characterized by neopatrimonial rule (Sandbrook, and Oelbaum 1999, Joseph, 1998, Lindberg 
2003). This assertion does not presuppose that neopatrimonial practice is limited to Africa. 
Indeed, it would be a flaw to draw such conclusion simply because neopatrimonialism is not 
limited to Africa; it is a global phenomenon (Theobad, 1982; Mkandawire, 1998; Erdmann 
and Angel, 2007).  What is missing in the literature is that the application and manifestation 
of neopatrimonialism differ from continent to continent and perhaps from country to country.  
 Neopatrimonial thesis, the focus of this investigation, though does not rise above any 
analytical variety; however, it intersects various levels of explanations to a greater extent than 
other presumptions.  Neopatrimonial thesis is therefore flexible and that theoretical flexibility 
is not a liability particularly when dealing with phenomenon so  erratic and complex. 
Nonetheless, the flexibility of the thesis so attractive may turn to weaken the strength of the 
presumption if overstretched.  Indeed, neopatrimonial thesis is probably less likely to 
producing testable hypotheses than any of its contesting presumptions.  Unlike other theories, 
neopatrimonialism is capable of sustaining any theoretical breadth simply because it is not 
used as an explanation of political phenomenon however; basically, it depicts the nature of the 
African state. And that makes its application in the description of a varied political 
phenomenon and outcomes very easy.  
 Furthermore, neopatrimonialism has been used both as theory and concept by several 
scholars (Lindberg, 2003; Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Aidoo and DeMarco2009). With regard to 
neopatrimonialism as a theory, scholars usually see it as being responsible for economic 
policy failures in Africa in the 1980s during which most African states pursued Western 
designed economic development strategies (e.g. Structural Adjustment Programme, 
PAMSCAD etc.) (Hayden 1985, Gyimah-Boadi, 2001).  It has also been associated with 
informalization of politics, retraditionalization of society as well as  a drive for disorders 
(political instrumentalization or disorders) (Chabal and Daloz, 1999).  As a concept, 
neopatrimonialism has extensively been conceptualized to cover, the nature of African state 
including; level of authority, power politics, political legitimacy, elections, corruption, 
nepotism, paternalism, cronyism, privatization and presidentialism just to mention few of the 
contemporary rubric of neopatrimonial concept.    
  In this paper, I focus mainly on neopatrimonialism as a concept and this may detain 
us for a while. The most recent rubric of ‘neopatrimonialism includes a broad range of labels 
such as transfers neopatrimonialism and transformational neopatrimonialism. See Table1.0. 
below for the conceptualization of neopatrimonial transfers and transformational. 
Figure 1.0. The Multi-Dimensional Framework of Neopatrimonial Logic 
NEOPATRIMONIAL TRANSFERS (A) NEOPATRIMONIAL TRANSFORMATION (B) 
Prototype 1:  Big men Syndrome 
Country: Ghana, Togo, Tanzania, Senegal   
 
Prototype 2:   Populist Politics  
Country:  Ghana, La Cote D’Ivoire, Kenya, Zimbabwe,  
 
Prototype 3:  Programmatic Appeal 
Country:  Ghana, Mauritius, Botswana  
 
Prototype 1: Relatively Small Selectorates  
 
Country: Rwanda,  South Africa 
 
Prototype 2: 
Relatively Large Selectorates 
Country: Ghana, Nigeria 
Electorates                                                                Selectorates 
Source: Author’s 2013 
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Table 1.0 above indicates two broad conceptual frameworks of neopatrimonialism. 
The transfers’ neopatrimonial logic comprises of three prototypes namely; the Big men 
Syndrome (BS), the Populist Politics (PP) and the Programmatic Appeal (PA). The 
Transformational neopatrimonial logic also consists of two types namely ‘Relatively Small 
Selectorates and Relatively Large Selectorates. 
 This transfer’s neopatrimonialism type is prevalent in Ghana to the extent that it has 
stimulated heated argument in respect of which is the most dominant in Ghanaian body polity.   
While Keefer and World Bank (2006) describe Ghana’s political system as being 
characterized by “pure neopatrimonialism,’ Booth and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) contend that 
Ghana is characterized by populist politics, others such as Nugent et al (2009) argue that 
Ghana’s politics is the big men type, whereas, Lindberg and Morrison (2008) claim, Ghana is 
gradually embracing programmatic appeal.  Interestingly, Whitefield, in a presentation made 
at the conference organized by Danish International Institute of Democracy (DIID) 2011, 
emphasizes that Ghana’s is a competitive clientelism.   But for Aidoo (2008), there is an 
alternation of neopatrimonial politics.  To him politicians promise programmatic when out of 
power, because they are not obliged to implement it, however, when in power they turn to 
pursue populist, after all, they have access to the means and the resources.  
 Meanwhile, with the Big men Syndrome, the political elite or leader is elected through 
mass adult suffrage and he /she is seen as a patron or transfer pump to distribute incentives, 
social benefits, favours in an exchange for political legitimacy. The political elite or leader 
establishes what Richard Sandbrook called ‘patron-client network.’ In this case, the 
sustainability of political legitimacy depends to a large extent on the continuity of this patron-
client network relationship. For the patron to be able to entrench neopatrimonial rule requires 
his or her ability to maintain frequent supply of neopatrimonial incentives- favours, money, 
roofing sheets, jobs and contracts kickbacks etc. however, as Chabal and Daloz (1999) put it, 
a neopatrimonial regime which exhausts resources turn to face institutional crisis, in that, 
when there is no longer funds to distribute, the next option is ‘disorders. An informant 
interviewed confirmed the scenario by saying, : when politicians are ‘broke’ they often  
overlook some illicit, disorders and resort to pejorative activities such as  ethnic mobilization  
or clashes and often  endorse and normalize illegal activities such as ‘garamsay’ operations 
etc. “ The informant cited classic Ghanaian example to be “where some supporters of the 
ruling National Democratic Congress party  seized  public toilets at Ashiaman,  a suburb of 
Tema in the Greater Accra Region and also toll booths on the principal routs  or highways  
within the country.”  As shown in Table 1.0.,  Ghana is characterized by Big men Syndrome 
(see van de Walle, 2002, Lindberg, 2003). This paper will address other practical 
manifestation of big men syndrome in the course of the discussion.        
 Furthermore, with the populist appeal, the political elite deliberately, design a policy 
and programme be it economic or social in outlook with the intension to canvas for or 
mobilize political supports. Usually, such policy, project or programme is tailored to the 
particular need of the people within a particular geographic coverage. Such policy, project or 
programme is purposive one and it is normally designed to satisfy ethnic, religious or regional 
consideration. Here about 69.0% of Ghanaians interviewed agreed that typical examples of 
such populist policies include Rawlings and the NDC’s Rural Electrification project executed 
in the mid 1990s, Kufour and the NPP’s rice importation policy in 2004 as well as Mills and 
the NDC’s policy which sought to impose heavy tariff on rice importation. This paper 
discusses further other manifestation of populist politics.    
 In the mean time, programmatic appeal concerns with national programme usually 
meant to alleviate particular problem affecting the general populace or citizenry. Such 
programme is considered vital and so, may serve as a drive to induce the citizens to vote in a 
particular  pattern. In other words, although, such programme is not particularly designed to 
attract the electorates’ votes however, in the end, it seems to be the ultimate goal.  The 
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majority about 75.0%  of the Ghanaians interviewed  confirmed for instance,  that Rawlings 
and the NDC regime’s programme of Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE), 
Kufour and the NPP government’s programmes such as; National Health Insurance Scheme, 
School Feeding and Capitation Grants and National Youth Employment Programme; and 
then, Mills and the NDC administration’s programme involving granting of subsidy on local 
rice production to specific local rice farmers and distribution of free school uniforms are form 
of programmatic appeal. This paper  will  further indicate how programmatic appeals 
contribute to entrench neopatrimonial exigencies in Ghanaian body politics. 
 With the transformational neopatrimonial logic, it involves either a relatively small or 
large selectorates respectively, who usually constitutes the powers that ‘make’ or ‘unmake’ 
the political leader. In the case of the relatively small selectorates as seen in countries such as 
Rwanda and Tanzania and in South Africa in the case of ANC (African Focus Vol. 6 :24), the 
Electoral College consists of few critical mass of potential  challengers  or strong political 
elites who is the repository of powers that decide who becomes the political leader or not. 
Often, these few selectorates are resolute in decision making process and that once decision is 
made it becomes irreversible. Indeed, responses gathered from the majority 81.1% indicated 
that Ghana under Rawlings and the PNDC and NDC1&2 regimes was a classic example.       
 In respect of the relatively large selectorates, the system allows quite a large number 
of the selectorates to exercise their franchise in the process of selecting political elite as a 
party leader.  According to a political analyst interviewed at the CDD, all political parties in 
Ghana are characterized by transformational neopatrimonialism (i.e. they all engage relatively 
large selectorates). The difference between the two forms of transformational neopatrimonial 
logic however, is that decision- taking processes as in the former is resolute and absolute 
whilst the latter is relatively flexible and subjectively contingent.  The two have some basic 
characteristic such as; they are both inherently transformational.  In other words, they possess 
the powers to ‘make’ and/or ‘unmake’ political leaders. It is also important to note or 
emphasize that ‘leaders’ are not ‘elected’ but ‘selected.’ How do these multiple forms of 
neopatrimonialism pave the way for democratic practice and its stability? This paper analyzes 
the relationship between neopatrimonialism and democratic stability in Africa using Ghana’s 
case study. 
 
Neopatrimonialism and Democratic Stability 
 In sub-Saharan Africa, neopatrimonialism has been employed extensively to explain 
Africa’s internal politics. And as such, its focus exclusively on internal dynamics of African 
politics serves as the basis for externalist linking neopatrimonialism and Africa’s political 
troubles just as the dependency theorists have linked Africa’s underdevelopment with 
dependency syndrome (Aidoo and DeMarco, 2009).  Broadly speaking, this paper outlines 
two ways by which neopatrimonialism could produce democratic instability.  
 First, neopatrimonialism may produce democratic instability when the neopatrimonial 
regime fails to rise and fall on its capacity to convince a critical mass of potential challengers 
that they are better off feeding at the government’s trough than searching for the keys to the 
silo (Aidoo and DeMarco, 2009). In other words, if the regime fails to satisfy the critical mass 
or, if circumstances change such that the regime is unable to support the critical mass, 
political instability is likely to happen.    Most authors do, however, claim that the short-term 
logic of neopatrimonialism leads to long-term instability, first by undermining economic 
growth and secondly by preventing the democratization of state institutions. These two 
assumptions are modifications of political economy explanations which are logically sound 
but difficult to verify empirically.       
 Second, neopatrimonial leaders manipulate their public office for private gain, 
promote rent-seeking in the form of outright theft, kickbacks, and straddling, that is, public 
officials using public office to secure employment or other assets in the private sector (Aidoo 
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and DeMarco, 2009).  Though personal greed fuels part of officials’ pilfering of state coffers, 
neopatrimonial leaders are keen on divvying up the national cake amongst current and 
potential supporters.     
 Political power in neopatrimonial regimes flows through the informal institutions of 
patron-client networks and therefore delegitimizes the formal institutions of government 
(Sandbrook and Oelbaum 1997).  This erosion of the rational-legal bureaucracy may 
ultimately undermine political stability. Van de Walle writes, “ Having too long undermined 
state capacity for political reasons, at some point the bureaucracy no longer performs at all, 
order breaks down, and leaders find it increasingly hard to manage the inter-elite 
accommodation processes that are at the core of political instability” (van de Walle 
2001:185).        
 Many accounts paint neopatrimonialism as political dysfunction, a system which can 
survive only by cannibalizing itself(Aidoo and DeMarco 2009).  And hence the social 
disorders, economic crisis or institutional decay created by this system spiral beyond the 
control of the political leader.  That notwithstanding; however, neopatrimonial regimes are 
not necessarily doomed to political instability. It is a strategy among many for political 
legitimacy.  Leaders would not employ it if they did not believe that it had at least a chance of 
working (implying that they are rational actors). Admittedly, it has failed miserably; however, 
it has paid huge dividends which have been attested to by a number of longstanding 
neopatrimonial regimes. For instance, Mkandawire (1998) points out that patron-client 
network actually played a role in the state-led development of many Asian countries. Besides, 
Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Daniel Arap-Moi, and Paul Biya employed neopatrimonialism to 
their advantage.   Lindberg’s study shows that politicians in Ghana strategically employed 
neopatrimonial networks. Using cabinet size as a proxy variable for the extent of the 
patronage network, his analysis reveals that increasing cabinet size by one ministry reduces 
the likelihood of political instability by a factor greater than a percentage increase in GDP 
(Lindberg 2003). The use of patronage networks helps us reconcile the variations in the direct 
access to state resources and a larger quantity of resources that would be afforded to political 
elites. Patronage is therefore used as a glue to hold the elite to the regime.      
 
Conclusion 
 This paper concludes that the nature of the state and its politics usually contribute to 
shaping the understanding of whether or not a country’s democracy will be sustained.  And 
that, although Ghana has more or less “perfected” her electoral democracy; however, 
neopatrimonialism is not only pervasive but also, sturdily holding sway the democratization 
of state institutions and its politics, and thereby, rendering  the relative democratic gains 
merely cosmetic in outlook. Again, it concludes that, because neopatrimonialism combines 
informal rule with an outward commitment to formal bureaucratic and legal standards, 
corruption is intrinsic.  Indeed, the toleration of corruption by subordinates may be one 
of the rewards that a leader can bestow. At the same time, neopatrimonialism (in general) and 
neopatrimonial corruption (in particular) are generally corrosive of political 
institutionalization, since they suggest the primacy of "connections" rather than the formal 
structures of law, constitutionalism, and bureaucratic procedure. Neopatrimonialism may 
therefore have both exclusionary and inclusionary components. Neopatrimonial political 
management may be exclusive, insofar as its benefits may be unevenly distributed in favor of 
individuals from certain class, regional, ethnic/religious, or kinship back- grounds. Those 
lacking "connections" find themselves unable to obtain access to state resources or influence 
state policy. Conversely, neopatrimonial networks may also be distributed widely, bringing 
very different critical mass in constituencies and different social elites into an overarching 
pyramid of patron-client relations.  
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 The extent to which neopatrimonialism is one or the other depends on a variety of 
factors- the nature of key political constituencies, the level of resources available to attract 
new clients, the existence of non-neopatrimonial alternatives, and the costs of 
nonparticipation as well as specific historical contexts.  
 In all cases, however, neopatrimonialism spurs rivalry and unhealthy competition 
among clients, as each competes keenly for scarce material resources and the patron’s "ear." 
Official lines of responsibility are hence overwritten by patronage and clientelism; the 
boundaries of public role and private interest are unclear, with public office representing an 
important mechanism of private rent-seeking; state resources (and the state's ability to shape 
resource flows) are used to lubricate patron-client networks. At the same time, the state's 
ability to extract resources and regulate behaviors creates conditions under which the supply 
of, and access to, scarce goods can be manipulated, the fundamental foundation of the power 
of patronage. 
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